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ABSTRACT
Working has become commonplace among college students; however, this activity can
have unexpected financial consequences. Federal formulas implicitly tax the amount of financial
aid students are eligible to receive by as much as 50 cents for each marginal dollar of income.
This tax creates an incentive for college students to reduce income, though abstruse formulas and
the timing of financial aid receipt are likely to limit responses. Using data from a national sample
of financially independent college students in the United States, I do not find that students bunch
below earnings protection thresholds in a manner that would indicate attempts to avoid
reductions in financial aid in total or grants specifically. Moreover, I do not find evidence that
implicit income taxes predict lower earnings in a manner that suggests that students
meaningfully reduce earnings in response to the tax. Therefore, while economically efficient, the
reduction in aid has the potential to burden low-income students who need to both work and
receive financial aid in order to afford college expenses.
JEL Codes: H52, I22, J22
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Acknowledgments: I gratefully acknowledge research support for this project from the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; all opinions and errors are my own. The author
thanks Sandy Baum, Ron Ehrenberg, Mark Long, Michael Olivas, Amaury Nora, and numerous
seminar participants for helpful comments, and Michael Laughlin for research assistance.

Vast public outlays are directed to encourage enrollment and ease financial burdens
among college students in the United States. An example is the means-tested federal Pell Grant
program that disburses over $30 billion annually and for which the yearly number of recipients
has more than doubled in the past 20 years (Baum and Payea 2013). Even with these large public
investments, many students face challenges affording college because of a growing gap between
costs and available financial resources (Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance
[ACSFA] 2006). This unmet financial need is one reason working has become commonplace
among college students. Over 75 percent of undergraduate students work while in college, with
recent student cohorts more likely to not only work, but work more hours than in the past (Perna
2010; Scott-Clayton 2012). These trends reflect both increasing rates of work among traditional
full-time young college students and the growing college attendance of “nontraditional”
students (Hess 2011; Perna 2010).
Working while in college can have unexpected adverse consequences to students’
financial aid receipt.1 Need-based federal financial aid formulas are based on the premise that
students should direct a substantial portion of their income toward educational expenses. As a
result, higher earnings result in reduced calculated need for financial assistance, and therefore
possibly less aid received—as much as 50 cents less aid for each marginal dollar of income. This
implicit income tax in the financial aid system has the potential to distort students’ working
behavior as it provides an incentive for students to reduce earnings immediately before or while
in college. Even with the incentive to avoid the implicit income tax, however, there are a number
of reasons to believe that responses will be limited, including a lack of knowledge students likely
1

Research indicates that working while in school can improve labor market outcomes (Light 2001; Molitor
and Leigh 2004). With regard to academic performance, researchers find null to small negative effects of increased
working on grade point averages, but that increasing working leads to lower credit accrual for some types of
students (Darolia 2014; Ehrenberg and Sherman 1987; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003).
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have about complex need formulas, the timing of financial aid application and receipt, and the
inability of many students to adjust their earnings because of financial obligations. A lack of
response would indicate that the tax is economically efficient; however, it may be particularly
burdensome to students who need to both work and receive financial aid in order to afford
college and meet other financial obligations (Baum 2010).
In this paper, I analyze the working disincentives created by the tax on income that is
embedded in the federal financial aid formula. The focus in this paper is on students who are
considered financially independent in financial aid programs. Though relatively understudied,
nearly half of all undergraduate students (about 9 million students annually) are identified as
financially independent.2 These students are not expected to receive financial support from
parents and have relatively fewer resources on average, making them dependent mainly on their
own earnings and financial aid pay for college. These financial constraints make this group
particularly relevant to study in the context of implicit financial aid income taxes. Furthermore,
financially independent students lie at the center of prominent public policy initiatives to
increase college achievement in the United States. Growing the college completion rates among
nontraditional working students is critical to recent federal higher education goals, but the
financial aid system is not well-structured to serve this population (ACSFA 2012; Kane 1997).3
There have been relatively few studies of the earnings disincentives in the financial aid
system, as extant research has focused on implicit taxes on asset accumulation behavior (e.g.,
Feldstein 1995; Kane 1998; M. Long 2004). However, income is the largest component of
2

In addition, all graduate students (nearly 3 million students annually) are considered financially
independent. Author’s calculations based on the 2012 Digest of Education Statistics (U.S. Department of Education
2013) and the nationally representative National Postsecondary Aid Study (see
http://nces.ed.gov/datalab/postsecondary/index.aspx).
3
For example, President Obama has set goals in his administration to produce 5 million new community
college graduates and to have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020 (White House n.d.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education).
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expected personal contribution to college expenses in federal aid formulas for most students
(Monks 2004). 4 The relative importance of income to pay for college expenses is especially
acute for financially independent students, since they have relatively low asset levels (financially
dependent students’ relatively high asset levels are typically a reflection of the assets held by
their parents). Furthermore, assets are not counted in federal aid formulas for many students,
such as those who have an income below a certain threshold ($50,000 in recent years) and
qualify for means-tested federal social programs. Therefore, most low-income and many
moderate-income students are only affected by the income tax, but do not need to be concerned
about the asset assessment.
Using data from a nationally representative sample of undergraduate students in the
United States, I do not find evidence that financially independent students strategically attempt to
avoid the tax by manipulating their earnings near thresholds where taxes start to be assessed.
Additionally, I do not find that implicit income taxes predict lower earnings in a manner that
suggests that students meaningfully reduce earnings in response to the tax. If anything, I find
descriptive evidence that students with modest incomes work more as implicit earnings taxes
increase, suggesting that the tax may be particularly burdensome for this group if they are
increasing work in order to make up for the loss of aid. I discuss implicit income taxes in the
financial aid system, and expected response to them, in the subsequent section. This is followed
by discussion of financially independent students, the data, and methodology. In the Results
section, I present results from tests of bunching near income protection thresholds and estimates
of the relationship between earnings response and implicit marginal tax rates (MTR). I conclude
with implications for policy.
4

This is particularly true over the past 20 years, since home equity, a major component of many
households’ asset bases, was removed from consideration in financial aid formulas as part of amendments to the
Higher Education Act in 1992.
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IMPLICIT TAXES IN THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID SYSTEM
Financial Aid Formulas
Federal aid is the sizable source of public aid used by students to pay for college, with
about $170 billion disbursed to students in recent years (Baum and Payea 2013). 5 The average
receipt and the number of recipients for the major broadly available federal financial aid
programs are listed in Table 1. Pell Grants and loan programs are the largest categories, both in
the average aid per recipient and the number of recipients. Federal college financial aid formulas
calculate the amount of financial aid provided to the student by comparing the cost of
educational attendance (including direct costs such as tuition, fees, and books, as well as indirect
costs such as housing, food, and personal expenses) with the amount the government expects
students and their families to contribute, formally called the expected family contribution (EFC).
EFC for a financially independent student is calculated as the sum of students’ expected
contribution from prior year income and assets. 6 EFC for independent students without
dependents is calculated as
(1)

𝐸𝐹𝐶 = [(𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼 )𝛺𝐼 + 𝐴]/𝑆

Contribution from income is calculated as the total income of the student (net of taxes), 𝐼,

less a protected income allowance level, 𝑃𝐼 . 7 The income allowance varies by marital status,

number of dependents, spousal college attendance pattern, and student and spouse income. The
assessment on income contribution is 𝛺𝐼 . Though not relevant for most students, asset

contribution, A, is a function of available assets, an asset protection amount, and an asset
5

States also heavily subsidize higher education costs at public institutions, but students do not need to
apply for the majority of this aid that is reflected in subsidized tuition prices.
6
The full EFC calculation guide is available from the Department of Education:
http://ifap.ed.gov/ifap/byAwardYear.jsp?type=efcformulaguide. Income is based on adjusted gross income from the
prior year tax filing, plus untaxed income and benefits.
7
Federal taxes in the financial aid formulas are deducted based on what was paid, while state and Social
Security taxes are assessed based on percentages in the formula.
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assessment. The sum of the income and asset contributions is divided by the number of
household members in college, S, to yield EFC. EFC is considered zero if calculated EFC is less
than zero. 8
The purpose of most federal financial aid programs is to support students with financial
need, which is calculated as the gap between college costs and EFC. All else equal, those with
more income and assets have less calculated need in the financial aid formula. At higher levels of
income, EFC increases, and consequently out of pocket expenses correspondingly grow. Funds
to cover out of pocket expenses include savings, contributions from family members, private
loans, and income.
Assuming all financial need is met by financial aid, the following schedule describes
students’ out of pocket expenses, OPE, which depend on EFC and cost of attendance, C:

(2)

0,
𝑂𝑃𝐸 = �[(𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼 )𝛺𝐼 + 𝐴]/𝑆,
𝐶,

𝐸𝐹𝐶 = 0
0 < 𝐸𝐹𝐶 < 𝐶
𝐸𝐹𝐶 ≥ 𝐶

The income allowance protects a limited amount of students’ incomes without a loss to

financial aid. This is because EFC will be zero when income is less than the income allowance
and with few counted assets. In this way, students with very low incomes have an income MTR
equal to zero. In the 2011–2012 EFC calculation, the after-tax income allowance ranged from
$8,550 to $16,670 for independent students without dependents and from $29,600 to $36,800 for
independent students with two children. High-income students also face a zero marginal income
tax rate if their income is sufficiently high that their EFC exceeds costs of attendance. In this
8

Independent students with dependents other than a spouse can qualify for an “automatic zero” EFC if they
satisfy both of the following conditions: 1) a member of the student’s household received benefits from the federal
SSI Program, Food Stamp Program, Free and Reduced Price Lunch Program, TANF Program, or WIC; or the
student and student’s spouse (if married) each filed or was eligible to file a IRS Form 1040A or 1040EZ, or was not
required to file income tax returns; or the student or student’s spouse (if married) is a dislocated worker; and (2) The
student’s and spouse’s (if married) income is below a certain threshold ($31,000 or less in the 2011–2012 school
year). Independent students without dependents other than a spouse are not eligible for automatic zero EFC.
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case, students are expected to finance all of their education from private sources (i.e., they
receive no federal need-based aid), and therefore earnings increases do not reduce aid receipt.
It follows that as income increases, out of pocket expenses grow by a rate of 𝛺𝐼 /𝑆,

representing the MTR, when there is a positive EFC that does not exceed cost of attendance and
zero otherwise:

(3)

𝜕𝑂𝑃𝐸
𝜕𝐼

0,
= �𝛺𝐼 /𝑆,
𝐶,

𝐸𝐹𝐶 = 0
0 < 𝐸𝐹𝐶 < 𝐶
𝐸𝐹𝐶 ≥ 𝐶

The calculation differs for independent students with dependents, as the implicit tax is
assessed based on the total amount of net income and assets. Holding all else equal, however, out
of pocket expenses similarly increase by the assessment as earnings increase. Further detail is
included in Appendix A.
Panel (a) in Figure 1 provides a schedule of the relationship between EFC and income
earned for four exemplar independent student households using the 2011–2012 EFC formula.
The horizontal lines are the average total price of attendance for public two-year, public fouryear, private nonprofit four-year, and for-profit colleges in the 2011–2012 school year (U.S.
Department of Education 2014). All students have EFCs equal to zero for some amount of
income allowance, and when EFC exceeds educational costs, students will not receive needbased federal aid. Panel (b) in Figure 1 more directly illustrates the relationship between federal
financial aid receipt and income for the same four students based on the average cost of college
at a public two-year institution. If all need is fully met, then financial aid receipt is equal to the
cost of education when income is less than the income allowance (this is when EFC is equal to

6

zero), then decreases linearly at a rate of 𝛺𝐼 /𝑆 for the two students without dependents. 9 The
income assessment rate for independent students without dependents has been 50 percent in

recent years, which yields an MTR of 50 percent for the single student and 25 percent for the
married student with a spouse in college in this range. Federal aid receipt declines at a rate of
𝛺𝑗 /𝑆, for the students with dependents, based on adjusted available income tier j as explained in

Appendix A. At higher levels of income when EFC exceeds the cost of education, financial aid
receipt is equal to zero.
Figure 2 displays the corresponding marginal and average tax rates faced by these
students as scheduled in the EFC formula. MTRs are calculated as the percentage change in
marginal aid for each dollar earnings increase (𝜕𝐴𝐼𝐷⁄𝜕𝐼 ). Panel (a) demonstrates that single

students without dependents face a relatively high MTR when compared to married students who
have a spouse in college in a specified income range, while the MTRs of students with
dependents follow a tiered schedule. Panel (b) displays average tax rates for all students, which
are calculated as the proportion of total forgone aid at each income level,(𝐴𝑖𝑑𝐼=𝑋 − 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝐼=0 )/𝐼.
Expected Response to MTRs
Earnings can reduce financial aid receipt for students with 𝐼 ∈ (𝑃𝐼 , 𝐶) for students with

few assets; therefore, following expectations from a simple labor supply substitution effect, the
implicit income tax creates a disincentive to work for students with EFCs in this range. Further
discussion and a graphical depiction are provided in Appendix B. Students with incomes outside
of this range may also respond to implicit taxes. It is possible that some students will reduce their
work effort in response to the general concern that they could lose some financial aid even if

9

Aid packages can be composed of grants, loans, and work-study with varying levels of subsidy and
benefits. As a result, students may not value all components of their aid packages similarly. I elaborate on this point
in the next section.
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they are not sure of the magnitude of their own MTR. As well, strategic students with incomes
just below the protection level (i.e., when with EFC just below 0 for a student with few assets)
might reduce their incomes in order to avoid the income assessment. I test for evidence of this
behavior in subsequent sections.
The composition of financial aid packages may also affect if, and at what levels of
income, a student responds to MTRs. Federal aid can come in many forms; Pell Grants are the
largest grant program and grants are most valuable to students since they do not need to be
repaid. Financial aid offices typically first assign Pell Grants to students. If student need exceeds
the maximum Pell award (the maximum Pell Grant award was $5,550 in the 2011-2012 school
year), then institutions will add federal loans and work-study to the aid package. 10 Loans and
work-study, however, likely do not have the same value as grants to the student. Researchers
have previously valued loans at 50–60 cents for each dollar of grant aid (Dick and Edlin 1997;
Feldstein 1995; M. Long 2004). Baum (2010) suggests that work-study has a relatively limited
value to students since the student is expending a similar level of effort as in a non-work-study
job and that the benefits are mostly accrued by the college. 11
As a result, students with need that exceeds the maximum grant award and who discount
the value loans and work-study may be more likely to respond to MTRs that reduce specifically
grant aid. For students with few assets, grant aid can be reduced when earnings are less than the
income protection level plus the maximum grant amount, G, and below college costs, 𝐼 ∈ (𝑃𝐼 +
10

Aid packages vary by student and by institution. Federal loan programs can have annual and/or aggregate
limits. For example, a third-year undergraduate student in the 2011–2012 school year could get a maximum of
$5,500 in subsidized Stafford loans, $7,000 in unsubsidized Stafford loans, and $5,500 in Perkins loans for that
school year. The generosity of some federal programs such as work-study, the Supplemental Educational
Opportunity Grant, and Perkins loans depends on school-level fund availability. Some states and institutions also
have state- and institution-level aid programs that can be used to bridge any remaining gap between federal aid and
student financial need, some which have eligibility standards based on academic performance.
11
Extant research indicates potential benefits to working on campus rather than off campus (Ehrenberg and
Sherman 1987), and other research suggests differential impacts based on work location (Pascarella et al. 1998).

8

𝐺, 𝐶). Therefore, instead of responding to taxes on total aid, some strategic students might

reduce their incomes to be just below the level at which earnings begin to reduce grant aid. A
graphical depiction is provided in Appendix Figure B2.
Even with the incentive to avoid the implicit income tax, there are a number of reasons to
believe that student responses will be limited. Some students with low incomes and few assets
will have little flexibility to alter their earnings in response to the tax because of difficulty
affording educational costs as well as meeting family or other obligations. In this case, a
dominant income effect may lead these students to increase their work intensity. The constraints
are particularly relevant for students who are financially independent, since they are less likely to
expect assistance from parents.
Moreover, the abstruse nature of financial aid formulas and the timing of information
about aid receipt likely hinder students’ understanding of the financial aid system. Students may
be unable or unwilling to change their working behavior if they are unaware of implicit taxes,
unfamiliar with financial aid formulas, or unsure of their expected aid receipt. Descriptive
evidence suggests that students commonly lack understanding about how much college costs and
how much financial aid they obtain (Akers and Chingos 2014). Ethnographic work by Ziskin et
al. (2014) reveals that misunderstandings and uncertainty are common among working students,
especially low-income students. Part of this may be because the financial aid process and
formulas are oft-criticized for being confusing and opaque (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006).
In order to obtain federal aid, students must provide detailed information about family income,
assets, and expenditures through the complicated Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA) form. 12 Bettinger et al. (2012) provide compelling experimental evidence that the

12

The FAFSA currently asks 116 questions making it nearly the length of federal income tax filing form
(Dynarski and Wiederspan 2012).

9

complicated application process and students’ lack of knowledge deter some potential students
from simply applying for aid; therefore, it is reasonable to believe that many students will also
not accurately compute tax rates associated with their work behavior.
The timing of the aid process further impedes students’ ability to respond to implicit
earnings taxes on aid. Consider students newly enrolling in college in the fall of 2011. These
students could fill out the FAFSA from January to June of 2011 (students are typically
encouraged to fill out FAFSA as early as possible in January and some states and colleges have
deadlines for scholarships). EFC is determined by inputs from the prior year’s (2010) tax returns.
Colleges are responsible for determining the amount of aid offered to each student, and financial
aid offers will vary at different colleges for the same student since cost of attendance and
available aid vary by institution. Students will typically find out to which colleges they have
been accepted in the spring of 2011, and receive financial aid award letters from these colleges in
late spring or summer of 2011. Therefore, unless they knew the colleges to which they will be
admitted, independently sought out relevant formulas, calculated their EFC, and accurately
estimated the amount of expected financial aid receipt, students would typically not find out
about the implication of their 2010 working decisions until the late spring of 2011, at the earliest.
A returning student may be more likely to have knowledge of the implications of working on aid
receipt, since they are more likely to have experience with the financial aid system in a prior
year. For this reason, I analyze heterogeneity between new and returning student responses in the
empirical analysis.
Another contributing factor to the lack of response to implicit taxes in the financial aid
system is that other social programs or incentives in the tax system may have more pronounced
effects. For example, some students may be more likely to adjust earnings in response to the

10

Earned Income Tax Credit with which they may be more familiar, rather than the financial aid
income tax. Researchers have also analyzed education credits in the federal tax system that
students can claim retroactively when filing their federal tax returns. Results from these studies
generally find little effect of these credits on students’ enrollment decisions; rather, they
predominantly subsidize costs for inframarginal students who would have otherwise enrolled
(Bulman and Hoxby 2014; B. Long 2004; Turner 2012).
Prior studies on responses to implicit college financial aid taxes have focused on the
effect of the asset tax in college financial aid programs on family savings behavior. Edlin (1993)
and Feldstein (1995) find substantial savings disincentives from college financial aid taxes, with
the latter author finding that married parents who are paying for child’s college reduce savings
by as much as 50 percent in response to the asset-tested rules in financial aid formulas. Later
work by Monks (2004) and Reyes (2008), also examining the savings responses of the parents of
dependent students, conclude that earlier estimates overstate the response of families, while Long
(2004) does not find evidence of a strong family response to implicit asset taxes. In addition to
scrutinizing some of the assumptions of earlier analyses, the newer studies also analyzed a period
during which home equity was no longer considered in financial aid formulas because of
amendments to the Higher Education Act in 1992. The lack of response supports the graphical
analysis in Kane (1998), which demonstrates that there is little evidence of adjustments to
families’ savings behavior just below asset protection amounts. Dick and Edlin (1997) provide
one of the few studies of implicit financial aid income taxes, where they estimate the level of
realized MTRs. These authors use a sample of financially dependent students from the 1980s and
do not examine potential responses to taxes.
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FINANCIALLY INDEPENDENT STUDENTS
The focal group in the analysis is financially independent undergraduate students, an
understudied but prominent group. Of the approximately 18 million undergraduate students in
the United States annually, the number that is financially independent is about equal to the
number that is financially dependent on parents or guardians (U.S. Department of Education
2013). Part of this is a function of the increasing average age of undergraduate college students
over the past 40 years (U.S. Department of Education 2013), as the EFC calculation
automatically classifies students over 24 years old as financially independent. Other factors that
determine financially independent status in financial aid formulas include being married, serving
or having served in the military, having a dependent or supporting a child, or having reached the
age of majority in their state of residence (often age 18) while no longer being under the legal
control of parents or guardians. EFC formulas automatically classify graduate students as
financially independent.
Financially independent students are less likely to receive financial support from parents
and are therefore expected to be more personally responsible for financing their higher education
(there is no formal requirement that they do not receive transfers from parents or family). Since
they personally control their incomes, they conceivably have more power to adjust earnings if
needed. On the other hand, since they are less likely to be able to enjoy contributions from
parents, they may not have flexibility to decrease income given educational and noneducational
financial responsibilities.
Many financial aid programs are not designed to serve financially independent and
nontraditional students. Kane (1997) describes how rules and formulas that evaluate financial
need are based on a model where students may make some summer income but predominantly
12

depend on parental resources. This leads to a problematic treatment of income in federal
financial formulas for many independent students. Consider, for example, students who go to
college at night while working full time during the day or students who return to college to
change careers after being a full-time worker. These students’ incomes can be taxed at the same
rate as dependent students whose primary support is expected from parents.
Table 2 includes a comparison of financially dependent and independent undergraduate
students from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) data available from the
National Center of Education Statistics (the data are described in more detail in the following
section). Almost all differences among students in the two groups are statistically significant.
Independent students are 11 years older on average, with a much larger variation in age. About a
third of independent students are married and over half have dependents; dependent students by
definition are not married and do not have dependents. Independent students are more likely to
be black and less likely to be white, and also more likely to attend public two-year and for-profit
institutions. This corresponds to being less likely to attend nonprofit 4-year institutions.
Independent students are also less likely to attend school full time, which may be because
of the larger work burden. They are only slightly more likely to work as dependent students but
work almost 10 hours more on average. Even though independent students work more hours,
they come from households with substantially lower income levels. Average total income in
independent households is $24,379, as compared to about $70,285 in dependent student
households; this reflects dependent students’ relatively high parental incomes. Average
independent students’ EFC is about a quarter of the level of financially dependent students.
About 80 percent of dependent students expect to receive financial help from parents for college
expenses (this question is not asked of independent students).

13

Taken together, these metrics demonstrate the challenge faced by many financially
independent students. They have relatively low incomes, yet over half have dependents for
which they must care. They are less able to rely on financial support from family than their
dependent peers. They are more likely to be enrolled in subbaccalaureate programs and attend
part time. Since they have relatively low EFCs, they are likely to be more dependent on financial
aid. These challenges underscore the importance of understanding independent students’ college
financing decisions and tradeoffs, particularly in the context of student financial aid.

DATA AND METHODS
Data
Student level data come from the 2007–2008 and 2011–2012 academic year waves of
NPSAS. NPSAS is a repeated cross-section of nationally representative student-level records,
including information on financial aid received, working and borrowing behavior, demographics,
and enrollment patterns. These data are especially useful for this study since they include
detailed data regarding components of federal financial aid formulas. All sample members are
undergraduate students; therefore, all results are conditional on an individual enrolling in college
and I cannot observe extensive margin effects of financial aid income taxes (i.e., whether a
student decides to enroll or drop out because of the tax). I restrict the sample to only students
who applied for financial aid. Unweighted sample size is 74,340 student records. Here, and
throughout the paper, all observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 per the data use
agreement.
Table 3 lists summary statistics for the sample. As previously described, the analysis
sample similarly contains a disproportionate number of two-year, for-profit, and black students.
14

Nearly a third of students are married, with just over one dependent and one household member
in college, on average. Prior year earnings in the data are based on total household earnings from
official FAFSA filings (e.g., 2010 year data for students in the 2011–2012 academic year
sample). Students have average annual household prior year incomes of $24,379. Current year
income data are self-reported and do not include earnings from summer employment or from the
student’s spouse. Average current year academic term earnings are $11,058. Average student
EFCs are $2,942. Asset contribution to expected costs (which is calculated as the total EFC less
income contribution) is $1,188 on average, though about 70 percent of students have no asset
contribution expected to defray college costs. Average total cost of attendance is $15,047, while
average total aid equals $8,107. Therefore, aid does not fill the full gap between average EFC
and cost of attendance. Aid is predominantly comprised of grants and loan aid, with average loan
aid receipt about 50 percent higher than average grant aid. Average work-study receipt is only
$110.
The relationship between earnings and aid is graphically represented in Figure 3. The
markers are the average aid receipt in $1,000 income categories with a locally smoothed line
among these points. The dotted grey lines are the 95 percent confidence interval. In panel (a),
we can observe a slightly negative relationship between total aid and income, with the variation
in average aid becoming more dispersed at higher levels of income. A downward sloping trend is
more evident when examining grant aid in panel (b), with a clearer negative relationship between
grants received and income. An opposite relationship is observed in panel (c), where loans
increase as income increases, though there is wider variation at higher income levels. This
indicates that even with increasing levels of income, many students are still borrowing at high
levels.

15

Finally, while Figure 2 depicts marginal tax rates based on illustrative student examples, I
plot the average MTRs students actually face in financial aid formulas in Figure 4. Recall that a
student’s MTR depends on marital status, number of dependents, student and spouse college
attendance pattern, student and spouse income, and measures of other financial resources. These
program characteristics mean that there can be substantial variation in MTRs at the same income
level, as reflected in Figure 4. Because of the income and asset protections, average MTRs are
near zero with relatively less variation for students with very low incomes, and rise to about 20
percent once incomes exceed $10,000. MTRs stay generally around this level until incomes
surpass $40,000. After this point, average MTRs rise to about 25–30 percent with a wider
standard error band through the remainder of the income range, mostly driven by lower sample
size at higher income levels.
Empirical Strategy
I first examine the potential responses to MTRs at the point where students become
subject to the reductions in aid with increased earnings by testing for bunching around students’
income protection level (point D on Appendix Figure B1) and also at the point where specifically
grant aid is potentially reduced because of increased earnings (point G from Appendix Figure
B2). Bunching around kink points has been a common focus for researchers, for example, in
response to income tax rates (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011) and Social Security Benefits (e.g.,
Friedburg 2000). Kane (1998) presents histograms in his study of financial aid formula asset
accumulation incentives to indicate lack of evidence of this behavior. If students are strategically
responding to income thresholds, we would expect to see a mass of students with incomes just
below the income protection level, indicating that students are adjusting their working behavior
in an effort to avoid the income assessment.
16

I next more formally test for level and slope discontinuities around the income allowance
cutoff. First, I use the McCrary (2008) level discontinuity test that is commonly used to assess
whether individuals manipulate their behavior in response to thresholds in means-tested benefit
programs. The test involves first categorizing data into bins, then separately estimating local
regressions on either side of the cutoff, with the number of observations in income bins as the
outcome and the distance from the cutoff as covariates. The densities above the cutoff are
compared to densities below the cutoff, 𝜃� = 𝑙𝑛𝑓̂ + − 𝑙𝑛𝑓̂ − , where 𝑓̂ + is the estimated density

above the cutoff and 𝑓̂ − is the estimated density below. A positive value indicates that there is a

higher density on the right of the income protection, while a negative value indicates that there is
a higher density to the left of the income protection.
I also test for slope discontinuities at the threshold based on Card et al. (2012) by
estimating
(4)

𝑌𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝜋1 𝑈𝑏 + 𝜋2 (𝐼̃𝑏 × 𝑈𝑏 ) + 𝜋3 𝑓(𝐼̃𝑏 ) + 𝜖𝑏

where Y is the number of students in bin b, U is an indicator for having an income less than the
threshold, 𝐼̃ is the distance from the income bin to the threshold (𝐼̃ = income – income

allowance), and 𝑓(𝐼̃) is a quadratic function of the distance from each bin to the threshold. Here,
I test for 𝜋2 = 0 to ascertain whether the slope changes at the income allowance cutoff.

The previously described tests examine earnings around a specific point; however, I am

also interested in the more general relationship between students’ earnings and MTRs. To
analyze this relationship, consider first the following equation to estimate income for each
student i as a function of the financial aid marginal tax rate on income, MTR, and a set of
covariates in X.
(5)

𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖
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From this regression, δ is an estimate of the conditional relationship between a unit
change in MTR and student earnings. However, there are likely omitted factors, such as students’
work ethic or unobserved financial resources that could affect both the MTR and income such
that 𝐸[𝑢𝑖 ] ≠ 0 yielding biased estimates of 𝛿. 13

Therefore, I add a control for the student’s prior year income to model 14

(6)

𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

The rationale for including prior year income is twofold. First, to the extent it is related to
confounding omitted factors, it mitigates bias by partially controlling for these student-level
unobserved characteristics. Second, given the complexity and timing of financial aid as
previously discussed, if students respond to implicit taxes, we would expect to see them adjust
their current year income in response to the MTRs to which they were already exposed, from the
prior year. Therefore, I estimate current year income for each student function of MTR faced in
financial aid formulas based on prior year income. Since all students who worked in the prior
year do not also work in the current year, I estimate Equation (6) using a Tobit specification with
a lower limit equal to zero. 15
From estimates of Equation (6), we can interpret 𝛿 as the dollar change in student

earnings associated with a unit change in MTR, while accounting for prior year income and
controls in X. I include in the X-vector controls for factors that can affect aid receipt in financial
13

The direction and magnitude of this bias is hard to predict because of the varied factors that affect MTRs
(recall that these can depend on students’ financial resources, but also family structure, spouse school/work
characteristics, and location), and the complex interrelationships between financial and family background, working
decisions, and factors that determine implicit income taxes. For example, work ethic is likely positively correlated to
earnings but is ambiguously related to students’ MTR, making it difficult to assess bias that could arise from this
factor not being measured.
14
Results from estimates of Equation (5) are available upon request. As described previously, current year
earnings are self-reported and do not include summer or spousal earnings. Correlation coefficients between prior and
current year earnings are 0.31 for first-year students and 0.41 for returning students, indicating a positive
relationship, but also variation from prior to current year earnings.
15
Estimates using ordinary least squares leads to qualitatively similarly conclusions and are displayed in
Appendix C.
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aid (number of dependents, marital status, number in the household in college, asset contribution,
asset contribution squared, and year of survey); college cost and college cost squared; factors
that could affect earnings (student age, age squared, race/ethnicity, indicators for whether the
student is a first or second generation immigrant); school sector (public, private for-profit);
school type (four-year or two-year college); and locale (small, mid, or large city, suburb, town,
or rural area). I also include vectors of indicators for state and year to account for variation
across states and over time, such as local economic conditions, college going rates, and
educational systems.
Another concern with drawing conclusions from observed relationships between income
and MTR is that parameter estimates could reflect nonlinearities in the aid formula, rather than a
response to MTRs. This issue is especially relevant for students with very low incomes (less than
$10,000 because of allowances in the financial aid formula as displayed in Figure 4). Within
narrower income ranges, however, average MTRs are generally similar. Therefore, I present
results from estimates of students based on various earnings categories. I base these categories
on prior year income to avoid further censoring the dependent variable (which is current year
earnings). This also allows me to examine potentially distinct relationships between MTR and
earnings among students with relatively low, middle, and high incomes.
Finally, I also separately estimate results for all students and for first-year and returning
students separately. Returning students’ prior year incomes are from a period when the student
was enrolled in college and therefore potentially better reflect learning associated with financial
aid system experience. First-year students’ prior year incomes, alternatively, are from a period
prior to the student entering college. Therefore, for timing and knowledge reasons that limit their
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knowledge of the system, first-year students are less likely to adjust work behavior in response to
income MTRs in federal financial aid formulas.
Even though I include a robust set of observable controls and account for unobserved
factors captured in prior year income, I am careful not to strongly interpret estimated
relationships from Equation (6) as causal. The data do not contain a full accounting of all factors
that could confound estimates. I consider results nonetheless informative since the interplay
between working and implicit financial aid taxes has been rarely studied in extant literature and
findings are useful in evaluating the theoretical predictions previously described.

RESULTS
I begin with a discussion of findings related to potential bunching around students’
income protection levels. Students are subject to different levels of income protection depending
on various student characteristics as previously described. I calculate the relevant income
protection available to each student based on her marital status, whether her spouse works and
goes to school, the number of dependents the student has, the amount of work income, taxes paid
or expected to be paid, and other considerations in financial aid formulas. Figure 5 presents
histograms of the number of students according to the distance from their relevant income
allowance level using $100 bins plotted on the x-axis. Positive distances indicate that the student
earned more than her income protection, while negative distances indicate that income protection
exceeded earned income. Therefore, we are looking for potential bunching just to the left of zero.
Visual inspection of all graph panels indicates that more students have incomes less than the
income protection within the $5,000 bandwidth. However, there does not appear to be distinct
bunching close to the threshold, nor right below the threshold where students can avoid the tax.
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To examine potential bunching more formally, Table 4 displays results from the level and
slope tests using $100 income bin sizes (results are robust to bin sizes twice as large, $200, and
half as much, $50). Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), I display results from a variety of
bandwidths. These tests confirm the visual inspection of the graphs and provide little evidence of
bunching near the income protection, with all estimates of density and slope discontinuities not
statistically significant.
In Table 5, I similarly test for bunching around thresholds where specifically grant aid is
reduced because of increased earnings. This value is equal to students’ income protection
threshold plus the maximum Pell Grant ($4,310 in 2007–2008 and $5,500 in 2011–2012), as
long as this total is less than cost of attendance. Here again, all estimates of density and slope
discontinuities are not statistically significant. Taken together, these tests do not provide
evidence that suggests that students are systematically manipulating their earnings near
thresholds at which implicit income taxes affect financial aid receipt. This could be because they
are either unfamiliar with the consequences of earnings in the financial aid formulas or they
cannot reduce their work efforts near these thresholds because of budget constraints.
Turning next to results from estimates of the relationship between MTR and earnings, I
present results based on Equation (6) in Table 6. For brevity, I display only parameter estimates
for the primary variables of interest, and full output for selected subgroups is available in
Appendix C. I present separate estimates from income ranges, based on prior year income, in
$10,000 increments up until $50,000, and group together students with incomes of $50,000 to
$100,000 because of the relatively small sample size within this range. Average current year
earnings for students in each range are provided for context. MTRs are in percentage points, such
that a 1 percentage point MTR increase is associated with average earnings decreases of about

21

$17 for students with incomes in the >$0–$10,000 range overall in the first row and first column
of the table. This is about 0.3 percent lower average earnings for students in this income range.
Separate estimates by first-year and returning students indicate that this overall effect is largely
driven by returning students, where the magnitude of the effect rises to 0.5 percent off the
average current year earnings for students in that group. Results from this lowest income
category indicate a negative relationship between MTRs and earnings, as would be predicted by
a labor-leisure model substitution effect. However, as mentioned previously, there is less
variation in MTRs among students in this category, and many face a zero MTR because of
income and asset allowances in financial aid formulas, which somewhat complicates
interpretation.
Turning to results in the next higher income category in the second column, I observe that
a 1 percentage point increase in MTR based on prior year income predicts about a $16 increase
in current year earnings overall (about 0.2 percent of the average earnings in the category). This
coefficient increases to almost $32 among first-year students (a magnitude of about 0.4 percent),
while the point estimate for returning students is small (about $5) and statistically insignificant.
Findings from the next income category in column 3 are similar, with magnitudes of coefficients
staying relatively small, at about 0.2 percent of average earnings, and with the coefficients in the
model including returning students only on the margin of statistical significance.
Results from these two income ranges (students with incomes in the $10,000–$30,000
range) are consistent with a dominant income effect, where resource-constrained students cannot
afford to reduce earnings in response to the tax so they increase work efforts to offset the loss of
aid. The stronger effect for first-year students relative to returning students suggests that students
may be learning about the financial aid system as they gain experience with it. Results are
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statistically significant in the relatively higher-income ranges, though I can rule out responses of
greater than 0.3 percent, 0.07 percent, and 0.04 percent of average earnings with 95 percent
confidence in the $30,000–$40,000, $40,000–$50,000, and $50,000–$100,000 income groups,
respectively.
While I reiterate caution with strongly drawing causal inference from the results, on the
whole, the observed relationship between current year earnings and MTRs does not suggest
large-scale responses to implicit taxes. Among higher-income students, I do not find evidence
that increases in implicit income taxes predict earnings changes at meaningful levels. Results
provide descriptive evidence that is consistent with the expectation that students with modest
incomes and less familiarity with aid formulas may have to work more in order to make up for
the loss of financial aid. Moreover, magnitudes are arguably minor, as in most cases a unit
change in MTR is related to well less than half a percent change in earnings.

DISCUSSION
Financially independent college students are a relatively understudied group in the United
States, even though they comprise about half of the undergraduate population. The prevalence of
these students is expected to grow, as policy initiatives that focus on increasing national college
completion rates need to engage older, nontraditional, and working students. These students face
unique challenges to attending college—they have relatively low incomes and are less able to
rely on financial support than their dependent peers, yet over half care for dependents. With
relatively fewer financial resources, they are likely to be more dependent on financial aid but
face a system that was designed with other types of students in mind.
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The implicit income taxes in the college financial aid system are an example of one of the
challenges faced by working students. Because they can reduce the amount of aid working
students receive, they have the potential to influence decisions about whether to and how much
to work while in or immediately before school. Research suggests that working while in school
can have labor market benefits, as it can augment work experience and aid in the development of
soft skills (such as time management, communication, and problem solving) that contribute to
academic and professional success (Light 2001; Molitor and Leigh 2004). One of the major
concerns about working while in school, however, is that time spent working can crowd out time
spent on academic, social, leisure, or extracurricular activities that positively affect students’
academic performance, social integration, and well-being. Existing research generally indicates
null or small adverse consequences to grades for marginal increases in work hours, and also that
credit completion declines with increasing work (Darolia 2014; Ehrenberg and Sherman 1987;
Kalenkoski and Pabilonia 2010; Scott-Clayton 2011; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003).
Using data from a large national survey of college students, I do not find evidence that
students are bunching below relevant earnings thresholds in an effort to avoid the tax on aid in
total or on grants specifically. One interpretation for the lack of bunching is that the amount of
income protection offered students is too low for many to reasonably adjust their work behavior
and still be able to afford educational expenses. Examination of the more general relationship
between implicit taxes and students’ earnings leads to a similar conclusion that students are not
meaningfully reducing work in response to implicit income taxes. If anything, results suggest
that students with relatively modest income levels might even increase work effort in order to
compensate for the lack of aid, though estimates are generally not large in magnitude.
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Informational deficiencies are likely an important contributor to students’ lack of
response to the income tax in college aid formulas, and these deficiencies are compounded by the
complex nature of aid formulas and the timing of aid application and receipt. This corresponds
with research documenting students’ lack of understanding about financial aid (e.g., Akers and
Chingos 2014; Ziskin et al. 2014) and would suggest that students are not making fully informed
financial decisions related to college. Students could be borrowing more in order to cover
financial shortfalls, and high levels of borrowing have been shown to affect some postcollege
decisions (Field 2009; Rothstein and Rouse 2011) and have also led to concern about potential
impacts on the economy at large. Further research is needed, however, to understand how
implicit earnings taxes affect other student behaviors.
The lack of a response to taxes in the financial aid system indicates tax efficiency, yet the
implicit taxes appear to burden resource-constrained students as they can lower financial aid
receipt among the students who likely need it most. If policymakers seek to address concerns
about these offsets, they should revisit the design of the financial aid programs with respect to
financially independent and working students. For example, in current federal financial aid
formulas, the implicit earnings tax rate for independent students can be as high as that faced by
dependent students, even though the latter group is expected to receive financial support from
parents and the former is not. Moreover, there is no corollary implicit income tax on the income
of dependent students’ parents in financial aid formulas. Therefore, policy could reduce implicit
income taxes for independent students to recognize their unique challenges and obligations and
to reduce the amount of aid that is offset by working while in school.
Furthermore, income protection limits could be increased in financial aid formulas to
allow independent students to earn a greater amount of money before income begins to be taxed
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(recall that independent students without dependents in the 2011–2012 school year can have their
financial aid reduced after they start to make over $8,550 in after-tax income; similarly, an
independent student with two children can have their financial aid reduced after $29,600 in aftertax income). Formulas could allow for an automatic zero EFC for financially independent
students with no dependents who have particularly challenging financial barriers, and the flat tax
rate faced by this group could be adjusted to increase progressively in a manner that is similar to
students with dependents.
A trade-off of such policies would be the increased likelihood of higher expected public
financial aid outlays, as well as increased prospects that public funds will be provided to students
who do not have strong need, but whose resources are not well-captured in financial aid
formulas. Policymakers should also take care to avoid further muddling a financial aid system
that is already difficult to navigate. The cost of complexity could be reduced, however, if
financial aid formulas were simplified to rely on a limited number of dimensions (e.g., Dynarski
and Scott-Clayton 2006).
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(b) Federal Financial Aid Receipt
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Figure 1: Example EFC & Federal Financial Aid Receipt
NOTE: Schedules are based on four exemplar students using the 2011–2012 EFC formula: a single student with no dependents, a
single working parent with one child, a married couple that both work and attend college with no dependents, and a married
student with a working spouse that has two children. Students are assumed to not qualify for the automatic zero EFC calculation
and assets are assumed to be zero. All working members of the household are assumed to earn at least $10,000. Educational cost in
panel (b) is assumed to be $15,000, the average cost of a public two-year college (U.S. Department of Education 2014). Panel (b)
assumes that all need is fully met by federal aid, which can include grants, loans, and work-study.
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(b) Average Tax Rates
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Figure 2: Example Marginal and Average Tax Rates
NOTE:

Schedules are based on four exemplar students using the 2011–2012 EFC formula: a single student with no dependents, a
single working parent with one child, a married couple that both work and attend college with no dependents, and a married student
with a working spouse that has two children. Students are assumed to not qualify for the zero EFC calculation and assets are
assumed to be zero. All working members of the household are assumed to earn at least $10,000. Educational cost in panel (b) is
assumed to be $15,000, the average cost of a public two-year college (U.S. Department of Education 2014). Marginal tax rates are
calculated as ∂Aid/∂Income and average tax rates are calculated as (AidIncome=x − AidIncome=0)/Income.

(a) Total Aid

(b) Grant Aid

(c) Loan Aid

Figure 3: Income and Aid
NOTE: Sample is independent undergraduate students from NPSAS 2008 & NPSAS 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey
weights used. Markers are the average aid receipt in $1,000 income categories. The solid line is a local 2nd degree polynomial
smoothed line with a triangular kernel. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence level.

Figure 4: Income and MTR
NOTE: Sample is independent undergraduate students from NPSAS 2008 & NPSAS 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey
weights used. Markers are the average aid receipt in $1,000 income categories. The solid line is a local 2nd degree polynomial
smoothed line with a triangular kernel. Dashed lines are the 95% confidence level.

(a) All Students

(b) First Year Students

(c) Returning Students

Figure 5: Density of Students Around Income Protection
NOTE: Sample is financially independent undergraduate students from NPSAS 2008 & NPSAS 2012. All dollars in 2012
dollars. Histogram bin sizes equal to $100.

Table 1 Federal Aid Receipt, Selected Programs, 2012–2013

Pell Grants
Subsidized Direct Loans
Unsubsidized Direct Loans
Federal Work-Study
Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant
Perkins Loans

No. of recipients
(millions)
8.84
7.52
8.59
0.70
1.58
0.46

Aid per recipient
$3,650
$3,690
$6,450
$1,403
$463
$1,857

SOURCE: Baum and Payea (2013).

Table 2 Comparison of Financially Dependent and Independent Students

Age
Married
Has dependent(s)
African American/Black
Asian
White
Hispanic/Latino
Public two-year
Public four-year
Private nonprofit four-year
For-profit
Full-time attendance
Works
Work hours (if employed)
Total income
EFC
Financial help from parents
Observations

Independent
Mean
Std. dev.
31.0
9.0
30%
46%
56%
50%
27%
44%
5%
22%
65%
48%
16%
37%
41%
49%
22%
41%
10%
29%
27%
45%
47%
50%
72%
45%
32.8
13.4
$24,379
$26,142
$2,942
$6,404
n/a
n/a
74,340

Dependent
Mean
Std. dev.
20.0
1.5
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
17%
38%
7%
26%
73%
44%
17%
37%
30%
46%
43%
49%
20%
40%
7%
26%
67%
47%
70%
46%
23.5
12.9
$70,285
$64,502
$11,187
$16,253
80%
40%
87,970

NOTE: Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey weights used. Unweighted observation count
rounded to the nearest 10. Differences between independent and dependent students are all statistically significant with 99%
confidence with the exception of the percentage of Hispanic/Latino students.

Table 3 Analysis Data Summary Statistics
Prior year income
Current year income
EFC
Asset contribution
Asset contribution > 0
Total educational cost
Tuition and fees
Total aid
Total grants
Total loans
Total work study
Public
Private nonprofit
For-profit
Four-year institution
Two-year institution
African American/
Black Asian
White
Other race Hispanic/
Latino
Age
Married
Spouse in college
No. dependents
HH no. in college
Observations

Mean
$24,379
$11,058
$2,942
$1,188
31%
$15,047
$5,506
$8,107
$2,998
$4,579
$110
62%
10%
27%
48%
52%
27%
5%
65%
7%
16%
31.0
30%
7%
1.2
1.1
74,340

Std. dev.
$26,142
$15,673
$6,404
$6,133
46%
$9,418
$6,157
$7,348
$3,695
$5,118
$667
48%
30%
45%
50%
50%
44%
22%
48%
25%
37%
9.0
46%
26%
1.4
0.4

NOTE: Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey weights used. Unweighted observation count
rounded to the nearest 10.

Table 4 Density and Slope Discontinuity Tests Near Income Protection Threshold

A. Estimated density change
All students
First-year students
Returning students
B. Estimated slope change
All students
First-year students
Returning students

$2,000

Bandwidth
$3,000

$4,000

−0.050
(0.050)
−0.007
(0.075)
−0.093
(0.068)

−0.032
(0.041)
−0.004
(0.062)
−0.056
(0.055)

−0.025
(0.036)
−0.010
(0.054)
−0.036
(0.048)

−0.022
(0.095)
0.016
(0.068)
−0.016
(0.062)

0.061
(0.047)
0.052
(0.034)
(0.205)
(0.031)

0.061
(0.047)
0.052
(0.034)
(0.205)
(0.031)

Table 5 Density and Slope Discontinuity Tests Near Grants Threshold

A. Estimated density change
All students
First-year students
Returning students

$2,000

Bandwidth
$3,000

$4,000

−0.074
(0.057)
−0.047
(0.093)
−0.072
(0.073)

−0.061
(0.046)
−0.054
(0.074)
−0.049
(0.060)

−0.049
(0.040)
−0.049
(0.064)
−0.032
(0.052)

0.007
(0.118)
−0.049
(0.074)
0.040
(0.074)

−0.047
(0.055)
0.048
(0.039)
0.005
(0.036)

−0.025
(0.034)
−0.018
(0.023)
0.004
(0.023)

B. Estimated slope change
All students
First-year students
Returning students

NOTE to Tables 4 and 5: Estimated density change is based on McCrary (2008). Estimated slope change is based on equation 4
from the text. Both tests use $100 income bins. Standard errors are included in parentheses. Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and
2012.

Table 6 MTR and Earnings
Prior Year Income Category
$0 < Inc ≤ $10K

All students

−16.93**
(8.38)
First-year students
−2.30
(13.66)
Returning students
−27.74***
(10.50)
Average current year earnings ($)
All students
5,206
First-year students
4,929
Returning students
5,431
Observations
17,060
All students
First-year students
9,930
7,020
Returning students

$10K < Inc ≤ $20K

$20K < Inc ≤ $30K

$30K < Inc ≤ $40K

$40K < Inc ≤ $50K

$50K < Inc ≤ $100K

16.04**
(7.25)
31.77***
(11.18)
4.92
(9.66)

30.32***
(9.08)
27.46**
(13.90)
23.37*
(12.15)

9.43
(16.95)
18.87
(26.68)
−11.49
(22.78)

−41.93
(49.33)
44.94
(74.03)
−69.46
(67.54)

27.63
(28.59)
54.30
(47.83)
25.52
(36.20)

8,382
7,848
8,870

12,485
11,185
13,587

15,902
14,059
17,180

21,040
20,477
21,389

22,648
20,197
23,883

14,330
7,720
6,530

10,070
5,160
4,820

6,210
2,810
3,350

1,970
810
1,140

5,380
2,100
3,220

NOTE: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Tobit estimates from equation 6, with controls suppressed (selected full output is available in Appendix
C). Income categories are based on prior year income. Average earnings reported are current year income. Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars.
Survey weights used. Unweighted observation count rounded to the nearest 10.

Appendix A
EFC Calculation for Independent Students with Dependents

For independent students with dependents, the implicit tax is assessed based on income
and assets, net of taxes and allowances, called the adjusted available income (AAI). The
calculation of EFC for independent students with dependents is
𝐸𝐹𝐶 = {𝑋𝑗 + (𝐴𝐴𝐼 − 𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼 )𝛺𝑗 }/𝑆

= {𝑋𝑗 + (𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼 + 𝐴 − 𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼𝑗 )𝛺𝑗 }/𝑆

where j indexes AAI tier; Xj is a tier-specific fixed amount; I and PI are income and
income allowance; A is the asset contribution; S is the number of students in college; and Xj ,
PAAI,j , and Ωj are tier-specific dollar contribution, AAI allowance, and assessments, respectively.
AAI tiers vary by year, with an example schedule for the 2011–2012 school year included in
Table A1. EFC is considered zero if the calculation yields a value less than zero.
It follows that out of pocket expenses, OPE, for independent students with dependents
are
0,
𝑂𝑃𝐸 = �{𝑋𝑗 + (𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼 + 𝐴 − 𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐼𝑗 )𝛺𝑗 }/𝑆,
𝐶,

𝐸𝐹𝐶 = 0
0 < 𝐸𝐹𝐶 < 𝐶
𝐸𝐹𝐶 ≥ 𝐶

Therefore, the marginal tax rate on net income earned above each tier allowance is 𝛺𝑗 /𝑆

when EFC is greater than zero but less than the cost of attendance, C , and zero otherwise:
0,
𝜕𝑂𝑃𝐸
= �𝛺𝑗 /𝑆,
𝜕𝐼
𝐶,

𝐸𝐹𝐶 = 0
0 < 𝐸𝐹𝐶 < 𝐶
𝐸𝐹𝐶 ≥ 𝐶
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Table A1 Contribution from AAI, 2011–2012
AAI
Fixed contribution amount ( Xj ) AAI allowance Assessment ( Ωj )
0 ≤ AAI ≤ $14,500

0

0

22%

$14,500 < AAI ≤ $18,200

$3,190

$14,500

25%

$18,200 < AAI ≤ $21,900

$4,115

$18,200

29%

$21,900 < AAI ≤ $25,600

$5,188

$21,900

34%

$25,600 < AAI ≤ $29,300

$6,466

$25,600

40%

AAI > $29,300

$7,926

$29,300

47%

NOTE: Does not include negative AAI values since these are assigned EFC = 0.
SOURCE: 2011–2012 EFC formula, available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/ifap/byAwardYear.jsp?
type=efcformulaguide&set=archive.
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Appendix B
Student Labor Supply Decision

Consider the labor-leisure supply trade-off in Figure B1. The y-axis is the total amount of
income earned from working as well as the value of any financial aid received. All nonwork time
is assumed to be leisure. The student’s budget constraint with no financial aid is the line AB.
Financial aid provides students with aid for college, and therefore allows some students to work
less while maintaining a sufficient amount of money to afford college expenses. The distance
from B to C represents the amount of financial aid available to the student when earnings equal
zero. Because of the income allowance, the student can work from C to D without any reduction
in aid. At point D, each dollar of earnings results in a reduction of financial aid. Therefore,
students wishing to escape the tax altogether will avoid moving to the left of point D.
From E to D, after the maximum income allowance, aid is reduced for each additional
dollar of income, where the slope is equal to the student’s marginal income tax rate (Ω, as
previously described). At point E, the maximum aid has been reached such that there is no tax
from segment AE. Therefore, the budget constraint for someone with access to financial aid is
AEDC. Because of financial aid, a student working H hours can reduce labor to H′ while
increasing utility since aid more than offsetting loss of income. Moreover, the value of each
additional hour worked by students in the segment ED is dampened by the loss of financial aid.
Consider next a student who discounts the value of student loans and work-study relative
to grants in Figure B2. The distance from B to F represents the amount of grant aid available to
the student when earnings equals zero; therefore, the budget constraint for someone who values
student loans and work-study at 0 is AEGF. For this student, grant aid is reduced with increased
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earnings at point G and students wishing to escape a reduction on grant aid will avoid moving to
the left of point G. The budget line for a student who discounts student loans and work-study but
values it at some positive value is AEGJI. These students can similarly escape a reduction in
grant aid by not moving to the left of point G, and would avoid moving to the left of point J
(equal to the income protection) if they wish to avoid forgoing student loans and work-study
funds.

Income +
Aid
A

U′

E

D

U

C

Financial Aid
Amount when
Earnings = 0

H

H′

B

Income
Protection

Figure B1 Student Labor Decision
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Leisure

Income +
Aid
A

G
E

D

C

I

F
Grant Aid
Amount when
Earnings = 0

B

Leisure

Income
Protection

Figure B2 Student Labor Decision Discounting Non-Grant Aid
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Appendix C
Supplementary Tables

Table C1 Marginal Tax Rates and Earnings, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
$0 < Inc ≤ $10K
All students
−7.71
(5.61)
First-year students
−0.39
(8.55)
Returning students
−14.78*
(7.62)
Average current year earnings ($)
All students
5,206
First-year students
4,929
Returning students
5,431

$10K < Inc ≤ $20K
13.81**
(5.50)
26.61***
(7.87)
3.98
(7.97)
8,382
7,848
8,870

Prior year income category
$20K < Inc ≤ $30K
$30K < Inc ≤ $40K
18.30**
−7.51
(7.14)
(13.65)
13.68
−5.80
(10.21)
(20.09)
14.60
−20.61
(10.28)
(19.43)
12,485
11,185
13,587

15,902
14,059
17,180

$40K < Inc ≤ $50K
−47.64
(40.06)
15.51
(59.42)
−66.83
(56.97)

$50K < Inc ≤ $100K
13.02
(22.92)
26.49
(35.67)
16.11
(30.58)

21,040
20,477
21,389

22,648
20,197
23,883

NOTE: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. OLS estimates from equation 6, with controls suppressed (full output is available upon request).
Income categories are based on prior year income. Average earnings reported are current year income. Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey
weights used.

32

Table C2 Estimates of Current Year Earnings, Full Output for Students with Prior Year Income
> $10K and < $20K
MTR
Prior year income
Cost
Cost-squared
Asset contribution
Asset contribution squared
# Dependents
Married
HH # in college
Age
Age-squared
African American/Black
Asian
Other race
Hispanic/Latino
First generation immigrant
Public two-year
Public four-year
Private nonprofit four-year
For-profit
Observations

All students
16.04**
(7.25)
0.35***
(0.04)
−0.36***
(0.05)
0.00***
(0.00)
−0.04
(0.05)
0.00
(0.00)
−59.04
(135.04)
−3,098.44***
(363.44)
1,621.72***
(422.15)
128.68
(98.24)
−2.12
(1.34)
212.98
(305.06)
999.62*
(606.97)
639.84
(511.19)
−629.46
(386.42)
−1,025.38**
(444.95)
3,154.62**
(1,582.64)
1,716.93
(1,611.63)
1,923.66
(1,632.02)
2,965.36*
(1,579.29)
14,330

First-year students
31.77***
(11.18)
0.38***
(0.07)
−0.43***
(0.08)
0.00***
(0.00)
−0.03
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)
−294.76
(197.52)
−2,244.51***
(547.14)
528.79
(680.76)
315.30**
(139.41)
−4.86**
(1.92)
304.51
(458.48)
2,791.46***
(1,003.16)
109.16
(840.07)
−400.38
(586.57)
−1,930.02***
(686.20)
5,636.54***
(2,068.07)
5,132.49**
(2,171.29)
5,401.59**
(2,269.31)
3,716.27*
(2,053.45)
7,720

Returning students
4.92
(9.66)
0.29***
(0.06)
−0.28***
(0.06)
0.00***
(0.00)
−0.01
(0.13)
−0.00
(0.00)
68.56
(188.70)
−3,627.69***
(491.54)
2,384.25***
(542.18)
−62.89
(140.06)
0.51
(1.90)
243.85
(407.59)
487.60
(762.03)
1,147.50*
(641.59)
−616.83
(514.10)
−325.79
(584.25)
152.08
(2,741.11)
−842.75
(2,756.40)
−536.95
(2,759.95)
2,768.56
(2,750.48)
6,530

NOTE: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Tobit estimates from Equation (6), with controls for
locale, state, and year suppressed. Income categories are based on prior year income. Average earnings reported are current year
income. Sample is from NPSAS 2008 and 2012. All dollars in 2012 dollars. Survey weights used. Unweighted observation count
rounded to the nearest 10.
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